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Having attracted the attention of Roosevelt, Rutledge was seriously considered as a potential Supreme Court nominee when a vacancy arose in 1939.[9]: 112 Although the President ultimately appointed Felix Frankfurter to that seat, he decided that it would be politically advantageous to appoint someone from west of the Mississippi—such as Rutledge—to fill the next opening.[9]: 112 Roosevelt selected William O. Douglas, who had lived in the states of Minnesota and Washington, instead of Rutledge when that vacancy arose, but he simultaneously offered Rutledge a seat on the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia—one of the nation's most influential appellate courts—which he accepted.[1]: 151 [2]: 1316–1317 Rutledge appeared before a Senate subcommittee; its members promptly endorsed the nomination.[1]: 176 The full Senate speedily confirmed him by voice vote on April 4, 1939, and he took the oath of office on May 2.[1]: 176–177 At the time, the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia heard a unique variety of matters: appeals from the federal district court in Washington, petitions to review the decisions of administrative agencies, and cases (similar to those decided by state supreme courts) arising from the District's local court system.[1]: 173–174 As a judge of that court, therefore, Rutledge had the opportunity to write opinions on a wide variety of topics.[1]: 174 In Wiecek's words, his 118 opinions "reflected his sympathetic views toward organized labor, the New Deal, and noneconomic individual rights".[9]: 112 In Busey v. District of Columbia,[a] for instance, he dissented when the majority upheld several Jehovah's Witnesses' convictions for distributing religious literature without securing a license and paying a tax.[11]: 359–360 Writing that "[t]axed speech is not free speech", Rutledge argued that the government could not charge those who wished to communicate on the streets.[12]: 94 His opinion for the court in Wood v. United States[b] reversed a conviction for robbery that had been secured after the defendant pleaded guilty at a preliminary hearing without having been informed of his right against self-incrimination.[2]: 1317 Rutledge wrote that the preliminary hearing was not supposed to be "a trap for luring the unwary into confession or admission which is fatal or prejudicial"; he held that a plea was not voluntary if the defendant was not aware of his constitutional rights.[1]: 191 Rutledge's jurisprudence emphasized the spirit of the law over the letter of the law; he rejected the use of technicalities to penalize individuals or to circumvent a law's unde
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